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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is the expressly invited guest. Should a friend who drops in for
an afternoon visit be given less protection than an expressly in-
vited guest? It should be considered that the extension of the
protection of reasonable care to the expressly invited social guest
is a rule which the court may have difficulty applying. There
are many situations which would practically defy classification
as being either express or implied invitations. For an example
consider the guest who enters the premises without an express
invitation but who remains on the premises in response to an
express invitation. While in the past cases of guests suing their
hosts were not common, the increasing prevalence of insurance
covering domestic injuries will likely cause an increase in the
number of such suits. An increasing volume of suits coupled
with a rule which is often difficult to apply could burden the
courts with a difficult administrative problem. It seems logical
that all social guests should be owed a duty of reasonable care.
The argument that the social guest merely enters on the same
footing as the family and that he does not expect reasonable care
seems irrational and not in keeping with the true attitude of one
who enters the premises of another as a guest. The burden of
reasonable care is not an onerous one; the owner is not under
absolute liability. It is submitted that the rule that all social
guests should be accorded reasonable care is logical and would
not be difficult to apply. In answer to those who might criticize
the expansion of protection because they feel that it will threaten
a homeowner with financial ruin, it should be pointed out that
insurance will allow the cost to be distributed among all home-
owners.
Ben W. Lightfoot
TORTS - LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - DUTY To
GIvE ADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION To INFORMANTS
Plaintiff sued the City of New York for the wrongful death
of his son, who was allegedly killed because of the city's failure
to provide adequate police protection. The deceased, Arnold
Schuster, in response to an FBI poster, had given the city police
information leading to the capture of the notorious criminal
Willie "The Actor" Sutton. Subsequently, Schuster received
numerous anonymous threats. He appealed for and was given
special police protection, but this protection was soon discon-
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tinued. He was then shot and killed by an unknown assailant.'
The trial court dismissed the complaint,2 holding that it failed to
state a cause of action, and this decision was affirmed by the
appeals court.3 On appeal to the state's highest court, held, re-
versed and remanded for trial. The city owes a duty to use
reasonable care for the protection of persons who have collab-
orated with it in the arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it
reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collabora-
tion. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
When sovereign immunity is waived,4 the courts in deter-
mining the liability of the sovereignty purport to apply the same
common law rules of negligence as are used in actions against
individuals and corporations. 5 There has been no hesitancy to
impose liability upon sovereignties under general negligence
principles if the activity is of a type that individuals also en-
1. See New York Times, March 9, 1953, p. 1, col. 8, for details of slaying.
2. 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1953).
3. 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1955).
4. New York has waived sovereign immunity to suit by legislative enactment.
COURT OF CLAIMS ACT, N.Y. LAWS ch. 860, § 8. Judicially interpreted in Bernar-
dine v. New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 604, 161 A.L.R. 367 (1945). For the
legislative and judicial development of this interpretation, see Lloyd, Municipal
Tort Liability in New York, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 278 (1948).
The federal government allows itself to be sued according to the provisions of
the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1950).
Many sovereignties only allow themselves to be sued through special legislative
enactment. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. III, § 35; LA. R.S. 47:1481-1486 (1950).
For a legislative and judicial development of these enactments, see Note, 30 TUL.
L. REV. 335 (1956). For practices in other states, see-PROSSER, TORTS 771, n. 5
(2d ed. 1955) ; HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, § 29.4, nn. 1, 2, 3 (1956).
Some sovereignties are said to waive liability when they purchase liability
insurance. See, e.g., Thomas v. Broadlands Comm. Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill.
App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1953) ; Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Education, 292
Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d 700 (1942). Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d
414 (1936). For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Austin & Becker,
Purchase of Liability Insurance as Waiver of Immunity, 54 MiCm. L. REV. 404
(1956).
Hawaii has waived sovereign immunity by judicial decree: "[Tjhe narrow rule
heretofore followed as to so-called 'governmental' or public functions and 'pro-
prietary' or private functions should not control the question of municipal liability
for its torts; that where its agents are negligent in the performance of their duties
so that damage results to an individual, it is immaterial that the duty being per-
formed is a public one from which the municipality derives no profit or that it is
a duty imposed upon it by the legislature." Kamau & Cushnie v. Hawaii County,
41 Hawaii 527, 552 (1957).
For a general discussion of the waiving of sovereign immunity, see HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS §§ 29.1-29.7, 29.11 (1956).
5. Bernardine v. New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 604, 161 A.L.R. 367 (1945).
Court of Claims Act, New York Laws, ch. 860, § 8.
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gage in," such as maintaining hospitals,7 maintaining public
places,8 and operating schools.9 Even where the sovereign ac-
tivity is peculiar to government,10 such as the furnishing of
police and fire protection, the courts may find that the sov-
ereignty is under a duty not to injure others by its affirmative
negligent conduct, i.e., misfeasance.1' However, where the al-
leged negligence is a failure to perform these functions, i.e.,
nonfeasance, the courts have been very reluctant' 2 to impose
6. It is not meant here to draw the standard distinction between proprietary
and governmental functions. This distinction is abolished by the waiver of im-
munity. Rather, it is the purpose of the author to show that the functions that
have been traditionally held to be governmental in nature may be distinguished
into those that are of a nature that they are performed by private individuals and
sovereigns alike and those which are peculiar to sovereignties only and have no
private counterpart.
7. Kamau v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527 (1957) (hospital employee mis-
matched deceased's 'blood type) ; Kiernan v. State, 194 Misc. 490, 87 N.Y.S.2d 73
(1949) (state liable for frostbite injury of patient who was negligently allowed
to escape from mental hospital) ; Liddie v. State, 190 Misc. 347, 75 N.Y.S.2d 182
(1947) (state did not use reasonable precautions to prevent patient's departure
from hospital to carry out threat of self-destruction).
8. Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527 (1957) (child seriously burned
after stepping in hot coals left on beach of public park); Dakin v. State, 284
App. Div. 53, 130 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1954) (claimant struck on head by falling rock
in state park, no warning sign was posted) ; Hawk v. State, 283 App. Div. 225,
126 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 788, 121 N.E.2d 620 (1954) (woman
slipped on sidewalk of state housing project) ; Caldwell v. Village of Island Park,
304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952) (infant injured by fireworks in public park) ;
Torjussen v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1950) (boy injured on defective
horizontal high-bar in city park).
9. Thomas v. Broadlands Comm. Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567,
109 N.E.2d 636 (1953) (student suffered loss of eye due to negligent playground
supervision) ; Underwood v. State, 279 App. Div. 823, 109 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1952)
(student injured by exploding refrigeration unit) ; McLeod v. Grant County School
District No. 128, 42 Wash.2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (girl raped by fellow stu-
dents during a noon recess in the school gymnasium).
10. This is the type of activity that is peculiar to sovereigns or one in which
private individuals only engage in to a very limited degree. Thus private individ-
uals could provide protection, conduct scientific experiments, or predict the weather,
but they do not do so on the scale or to the extent as that which is demanded of
sovereignties.
11. Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 176 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1958)
(taxicab driver shot by a passenger negligently placed in his cab by policeman) ;
Benway v. City of Watertown, 1 App. Div.2d 465, 151 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1956) (wife
shot by husband to whom police had returned a pistol) ; Flamer v. City of Yonkers,
309 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E.2d 838 (1955) (person negligently shot by policeman in a
scuffle) ; Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E.2d 338 (1954)
(bystander negligently shot by a policeman engaged in an argument with another) ;
Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604, 161 A.L.R. 367
(1946) (person injured by runaway police horse).
12. It may be noted in the instant case that the court found a duty and threw
the questions of breach and cause in fact to the jury. The court obviously felt
that its non-suit power was adequate enough to control the jury's action. Since
the police hold themselves out to be persons of special training they would be held
to conform to a standard established by expert testimony. PROSSER, TORTS 132 (2d
ed. 1955) ; HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 16.6, 17.1, 17.4 (1956). The jury will be
called upon to decide the very difficult and traditionally discretionary questions
of how long should protection have been continued and how many policemen would
have to 'be furnished to provide this protection. By doing so the jury will be deciding
1959] NOTES
upon sovereignties duties of taking affirmative action. 13  There
are at least three objections to imposing such a duty. First, most
sovereign functions are authorized by legislative enactment to
be performed by the executive departments. Since the adminis-
tration of these functions is largely discretionary, it would often
be undesirable to let judges and juries determine governmental
policies which by their nature should be determined by political
process. 1 4 To function efficiently sovereignties need a flexibility
of movement which would not be afforded by rigid standards of
care that might be judicially imposed. Secondly, since the public
benefit demands the performance of these extensive and often
policy questions normally left to administrative officials. They will also be estab-
lishing rigid standards that will have to be observed in the future. The cause in
fact problem will also create serious questions for jury determination. The jury
will have to decide whether or not the failure of the police to provide adequate
protection was a cause of the victim's death and whether or not such death in fact
resulted from the deceased's giving information. The court in the instant case
found that the facts raised a jury issue on these questions. "It might even
be held, without identification of Schuster's assailant, that the probability is so
great of his having been shot by reason of his disclosures resulting in Sutton's
capture, that a question of fact would be created on this issue." Schuster v. City
of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1958).
13. "The law is established that a municipality is answerable for the negligence
of its agents in exercising a proprietary function, and at least for their negligence
of commission in exercising a governmental function, . . . but a municipality is
not liable for its failure to exercise a governmental function, such as to provide
police and fire protection." Murrain v. Wilson Line, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 375,
59 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753 (1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947). Accord:
Rocco v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 1012, 126 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1953) ; Landby
v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 278 App. Div. 965, 105 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1951);
Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945) ; Moch Co. v. Rens-
selaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199 (1928). By refusing
to apply to sovereignties the general rules of tort liability for nonfeasance and by
traditionally holding that the statutes which create governmental units impose
duties owed to the public in general and not the individual members thereof in the
absence of language clearly designed to have that effect, the courts have refused
to impose liability for a negligent failure to act. There have been cases making
inroads into this position: Rosensweig v. State, 5 App. Div. 293, 171 N.Y.S.2d
912 (1958) (failure of state athletic commissioner to prohibit boxer to fight after
two knockouts in 5 weeks) ; Merstinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132
N.E.2d 900 (1956) (city liable for failure to train police officer to shoot straight) ;
Runkel v. New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953) (city held liable
for injury to children because it was negligent in failing to have building torn
down) ; McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947) (city
held liable for negligently having omitted to discharge a police officer who shot
and killed a person) ; Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945) (sov-
erignty held liable for damages in accident because of its failure to replace burnt
out traffic light). For a discussion of these distinctions, see Lloyd, Le Roi Est
Mort: Vive Le Roil, 24 N.Y.U.L. REv. 38 (1949).
14. For discussion of why courts are hesitant to impose liability for negligence
in discretionary functions of government, see HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 29.3,
n. 10, 29.9, 29.10 (1956). See also id. § 29.14 for discussion of Section 2 680(a) of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, dealing with immunity in discretionary actions. It
may be noted that in most of the cases dealing with negligence in the police func-
tion, liability has usually been imposed on the individual policeman level. But the
court has gone into the upper echelons, as in the instant case and in the Rosen-
8weig, Runkel, and McCrink cases cited in note 13 supra.
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dangerous activities, which only the sovereignty can effectively
undertake, imposing liability for a failure to perform them would
often result in ruinous cost consequences.5 Thus to a munici-
pality that is barely able to afford the maintenance of a fire
department, imposition of tort liability would make the reten-
tion of this service financially unfeasible. Finally, the existing
rules of tort law may be inadequate to cope with the unparalleled
and unique situations created by sovereign activity.16
Although the negligence alleged in the instance case consisted
of a failure to perform a purely governmental function, the court
did not feel that the above-mentioned objections were sufficient
to preclude a finding that there was a duty to provide adequate
police protection. It would appear that the objections were over-
come because of the restricted factual situation in which the
case arose. The victim collaborated with the sovereignty in the
arrest or prosecution of a criminal. The sovereignty was reason-
ably aware of the existence of the particular individual's danger.
The danger involved was unusual or above that to which the
ordinary citizen is normally subjected and this danger resulted
from the victim's collaboration. 17 The apparent policy basis of
the court's decision was to assure informants and witnesses of
reasonable protection in order to encourage collaboration with
law enforcement agencies.
There are several tort theories that could be urged in support
of the instant case. If it could be shown that the sovereignty
had actively induced the deceased to enter into a dangerous ac-
tivity, thus placing himself in a position of peril, there would
arise on the part of the sovereignty a duty to take affirmative
action to prevent injury since the sovereignty was in fact the
peril-maker.' Injurious reliance could also be advanced as a
15. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, § 29.3, nn. 9, 11 (1956).
16. The fact that there is no case authority in this area would seem to be
authority for this proposition.
17. It would seem that the rule to be derived from this case is that the sov-
ereignty is under a duty to provide special protection to informants and collab-
orators, when it has reasonable awareness of the particular individual's unusual
danger. The determination of the elements of reasonable awareness and unusual
danger will probably be given to the jury. It is doubted that the sovereignty will
be required to seek out the danger, but will only be held to act where reasonably
aware of its existence.
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 302, Comments (b), (m), (n) (1934). The court
in the instant case tried to apply this theory to the factual situation. It empha-
sized the use by the sovereignty of the reward poster as an inducement to peril.
It also tried to extend the legislative intention of the New York statute which
allows recovery for harm occasioned by compulsory police assistance further than
it was designed for. N.Y. PENIAL LAW § 1848. Undoubtedly if the deceased had
[Vol. XIX
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possible basis of liability.19 The sovereignty has undertaken the
care and custody of the public by furnishing police protection.
The public has come to rely on the sovereignty for this service
and has usually not sought other means of self protection. Indeed,
society has been stripped of certain means of self protection.20
Therefore it would seem that the sovereignty could be held under
a duty to take affirmative action since another had reasonably
relied upon it for protection. 2' Finally, it may be that a sov-
ereignty should be held to be under a duty to take affirmative
action to aid or protect one who voluntarily does something for
its benefit or assists it in the performance of one of its func-
tions. While such a rule does not exist with respect to private
individuals or corporations2 2 perhaps it would be of great benefit
to the public that such a rule should apply to sovereignties. 23
The court in the instant case expressed its intention to aban-
don the old position of no liability for a failure to perform func-
tions peculiar to government and allow recovery in a few limited
factual situations. The opinion raises questions as to just how
far liability can be effectively imposed to alleviate individual
losses, without materially affecting the efficiency of sovereign
activity.24 It is possible that the decision of the instant case has
been harmed while actively assisting the police, liability could have been found.
However, such was not the case. It also may be noted that the reward poster
involved was that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and not that of the City
of New York. It is also interesting to note that if the deceased had been actively
assisting the sovereignty to its benefit and was injured he could have probably
recovered damages in the form of expenses by virtue of the theory of negotiorum
gestio which is embodied in LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2295, 2299 (1870).
19. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 325, comment (b) (1934).
20. See, e.g., N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS, bk. 39, pt. 2, Penal Law § 1897 (1952),
which makes it unlawful to use and carry dangerous weapons without a permit.
See also LA. R.S. 14:94-95, 80:1751-1791 (1950).
21. It would seem doubtful that this theory could be applied to the facts of
the instant case. The court tried to use it by saying that the deceased depended
on the police for protection and that he was lulled into a sense of false security
and thus ventured out upon the street. However, it was a fact that the deceased
was aware of the discontinuance of the special protection. He could have obtained
protection from other sources.
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, topic 7 (Duties of Affirmative Action) §§ 314-325
(1934).
23. Perhaps the court in the instant case intended to create a new special rela-
tion to fit under the rule of id. § 315, which would exist whenever the individual
has assisted the sovereignty in doing something for the benefit of society. The
court here may feel that it is for the greatest public benefit to encourage individ-
uals to assist the sovereignty in carrying out these functions.
24. The rule of the instant case might be extended from informants and col-
laborators in criminal activities to all areas where individuals give assistance to
the sovereignty and suffer injury. The concept of aid could well not be required
and the sovereignty might be held to act whenever it is aware of the unusual dan-
ger of an individual member of society. It would seem that the courts would be
hesitant to extend the rule from individuals to special groups or classes of persons
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opened a Pandora's Box of liability and the courts will be forced
to retreat to their former position.
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - HEART FLUTTER AS PERSONAL
INJURY BY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Plaintiff-employee brought suit to obtain workmen's com-
pensation benefits for injury sustained during the course of his
employment. Employee's normal duties consisted of heavy
manual labor under conditions of extreme heat. While perform-
ing these duties, he felt his heart quivering. Believing it not to
be serious, he completed his shift and also worked the next day,
experiencing similar symptoms. The next day, his day off, he
drank a soft drink and fainted. Examination revealed that he
was suffering from impure flutter and auricular fibrillation.'
He was advised to avoid physical exertion for an indefinite
period. He then brought this suit for compensation. Medical
testimony established that the employee, unknown to him, had
suffered arteriosclerois for some time prior to these events and
that heavy exertion could send a diseased heart into fibrillation.
There was also testimony that the type of work which the em-
ployee was doing hastened his entering into a period of disability
and that the quivering experienced at work marked the onset
of fibrillation. The trial court allowed compensation.2  On ap-
peal, held, affirmed. 3 The medical testimony had established
because here the administrative problem is greatly multiplied. In a recent decision
liability was denied where the sovereignty was aware of the particular places or
areas being dangerous to particular classes of citizens. Langer v. City of New
York, 9 Misc.2d 1002, 171 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1958).
1. Flutter and fibrillation occur when the pacemaker begins sending out a
greatly increased number of impulses so that the atria attempt to contract more
rapidly than the ventricles can pump as a result of which they pump at their own
rate which is usually grossly irregular. Neldare v. Schuylkill Products Company,
107 So.2d 487, 489 (La. App. 1958).
2. Employee was held to be totally disabled. Medical testimony established
that he was unable to return to any work requiring the physical exertion neces-
sary in his previous employment. A worker will be regarded as totally disabled
if he is unable to do work reasonably of the same kind and character as that
which his training, education, experience, and status in life qualify him to perform,
in the customary way without any unusual difficulty or pain. Malone, Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation, page 327. Compensation was computed on a five day
week of $50, being 65% of $50 or $32.50 per week.
3. The judgment was modified to the extent of raising the award to $35 per
week by basing compensation on a six day week. An injured workman is entitled
916 [Vol. !XIX
